Optimal cooperative model for the security of gas supply on European gas networks by Yusta, Jose M & Beyza Bravo, Jesus
Energy Strategy Reviews 38 (2021) 100706
Available online 10 September 2021
2211-467X/© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Optimal cooperative model for the security of gas supply on European 
gas networks 
Jose M. Yusta *, Jesus Beyza 
University of Zaragoza, Department of Electrical Engineering, C/Maria de Luna 3, 50018, Zaragoza, Spain   
A R T I C L E  I N F O   
Keywords: 




Security of supply 
A B S T R A C T   
Natural gas infrastructures play a key role in the transition towards the new energy model, with a high share of 
renewable energies, both ensuring the firm capacity of electric power systems and integrating all energy vectors. 
The European Union (EU) strongly depends on external natural gas suppliers and is thus particularly vulnerable. 
In the event of supply problems due to natural phenomena, technical failures or other threats, cooperation be-
tween EU countries would be essential to best solve a supply crisis. This study proposes an EU cooperative model 
to meet the gas demand over a fourteen-day crisis, using a mathematical optimisation approach for resources and 
infrastructure. The model considers the dynamic management of underground gas storage facilities, limiting 
daily withdrawal based on the amount of working gas available in each storage facility. The ability of the model 
to make quick decisions is illustrated in six gas-demand case studies of the European cold wave in January 2017 
and hypothetical supply disruptions.   
1. Introduction 
As part of the new international policy to reduce pollutant emissions, 
most developed countries are closing coal-fired power stations. These 
power stations are being replaced by other, more modern, power pro-
duction technologies, which mainly use natural gas and renewable en-
ergy sources. The International Energy Agency estimates that replacing 
coal-with gas-fired power stations could reduce up to 1.2 gigatons of 
CO2 because the latter emit 50% less pollutants than the former [1]. The 
creation of international emissions markets and regulations has 
remarkably raised the cost of coal-fired power generation, rendering 
gas-fired power generation increasingly attractive. In fact, low natural 
gas prices have accelerated this trend in 2020 [2]. 
While many countries are setting ambitious decarbonisation targets 
for 2030 and 2050, the transition towards 100% renewable energy re-
quires power generation technologies that provide electric power sys-
tems with firm capacity. Until commercially viable, large-scale 
electricity storage technologies are available, electric power systems 
will depend on predictable and reliable energy generation sources like 
gas-fired power plants [3]. In addition, gas infrastructures do allow 
seasonal energy storage, which also provides significant value in 
ensuring electricity supply through combined-cycle gas plants. There-
fore, these stations play a key role in the security of electricity supply. 
Notwithstanding the importance of natural gas as a transition fuel for 
supporting renewable energy development in the short and medium 
term, the demand for gas is expected to decline in the long term [4,5]. 
This perspective can limit future investments in new gas transmission 
and storage infrastructure projects even though the gas sector is pro-
moting alternatives for the use of existing networks with new energy 
vectors, such as hydrogen, to address its decreasing importance from 
2030 [6,7]. 
As the world’s largest importer of natural gas and, therefore, highly 
dependent on other countries, the European Union (EU) is a very unique 
case. Its annual consumption is approximately 500,000 million m3, and 
its dependence on external suppliers reached 90% in 2019 [8]. Russia is 
the main natural gas supplier to the EU (45%), followed by Norway 
(21%) and Algeria (12%) [9]. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports to the 
EU increased for geopolitical reasons of supply diversification, reaching 
22% of total gas imports in 2019. However, pipeline gas imports remain 
the main source of foreign gas entry into the EU, and some major pro-
jects for new international gas pipelines running from Russia and Cas-
pian countries to Europe are under development, such as Nord Stream 2, 
TurkStream and TANAP-TAP (Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline - 
Trans Adriatic Pipeline). 
In addition to improving the natural gas supply infrastructures, the 
EU has proposed new cooperative mechanisms to reduce the impact of 
supply crises by increasing cross-border pipeline gas exchange when 
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necessary [10,11]. These regulations do not aim to replace the national 
energy policies, but rather to facilitate mutual support between natural 
gas-producing countries, LNG-importing countries, pipeline gas transit 
countries and the other EU countries. Similar cooperative mechanisms 
have also been proposed for risk-preparedness in the electricity sector 
[12]. 
Intentional attacks, cold waves, or technical failures can affect gas 
supply. However, when operators of national transmission systems face 
these crises, they usually make decisions considering their endogenous 
resources, overlooking possible collaborative actions with neighbouring 
countries. In turn, given the dynamic nature of gas production, storage 
and flows in networks, establishing contingency plans for all possible 
scenarios during an energy supply crisis is practically impossible. In 
addition, such a crisis may require continuously updating the in-
terventions in the infrastructure, especially if the crisis lasts for a long 
period. 
Thus, this study proposes a novel approach to developing strategies 
to optimally respond to possible crises, beyond the classical simulation 
approach for risk assessment. For this purpose, mathematical optimi-
sation tools are used to apply cooperative strategies towards meeting as 
much as possible the demand in all EU-28 member states and in some 
neighbouring countries. The mathematical problem is formulated 
considering the daily production and storage capacities, cross-border 
interconnections and third-party country LNG or gas pipeline imports 
of each country. The EU network model of gas transmission in-
frastructures captures the different characteristics of national systems 
and manages gas exchange between countries to determine the best 
possible solution for global EU supply. 
Another novelty of this research is the application of the proposed 
mathematical model to identify the best strategy for a two-week winter 
gas supply crisis by calculating the most adequate daily use of resources 
and infrastructures while maximising the satisfied demand over the 
entire fourteen-day period. The effects of emptying gas reservoirs and 
reducing the daily withdrawal with the decrease in stored working gas 
volume are analysed. The two-week case study is a common research 
strategy in studies simulating the security-of-supply of natural gas 
conducted by the European Network of Transmission System Operators 
for Gas (ENTSO-G) in Europe because this design makes it possible to 
capture the effect of a cold wave on gas supply and, especially, on gas 
storage [13]. 
This article is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the 
main gas system models. Section 3 describes the optimisation model 
proposed to determine the optimal management of a fourteen-day nat-
ural gas supply crisis in the EU. Section 4 presents six case studies based 
on possible supply outages in the European gas transmission network. 
Section 5 discusses the findings, and, last, Section 6 outlines the main 
conclusions of this paper. 
2. Modelling of gas systems for the security of supply: state of 
the art 
The most widely used approach in risk assessment studies for inter-
connected natural gas systems is the set of probabilistic methods known 
as Monte Carlo. The Monte Carlo method has been used to evaluate the 
behaviour of natural gas networks in different events [14,15]. This 
method is based on repetitive simulations of how the system operates 
under different assumptions of accidental or intentional contingencies in 
gas supply and transportation infrastructures. Each possible contingency 
is assigned a specific probability. Hence, the method makes it possible to 
evaluate all possible consequences by estimating the input uncertainties 
of the model, running the model under different values of input pa-
rameters and by describing the consequences in statistical terms [16]. 
The risk assessment studies for interconnected gas systems 
frequently rely on a simplified mass balance model in which the equa-
tions are obtained by applying the principle of mass conservation at each 
network node [14,15], rather than on a dynamic hydraulic model of the 
gas transmission system [17] since the latter requires extensive knowl-
edge of the parameters and technical characteristics of the networks. If 
this information would be available, specific software programs such as 
SAInt can simulate the dynamic operation of gas networks for assessing 
the security of supply [18]. 
While simulation models analyse the consequences of different sys-
tem contingencies, there is a lack of research providing strategies to 
optimally respond to possible gas supply crises. Using mathematical 
optimisation rather than probability-based approaches may be appro-
priate if the time frame for making decisions about available resources is 
limited because traditional probabilistic simulation models used to 
determine the impact of disturbances on gas supply take a long time to 
run. Therefore, a mathematical optimisation approach makes it possible 
to obtain the best possible operation of an interconnected gas infra-
structure under different supply disruption conditions. 
Some models apply optimisation in gas systems, but they aim to 
examine how markets function, to reduce costs or to analyse the impact 
of different changes in regulatory frameworks on market participants. 
Among these, the GASMOD model is formulated as a two-stage game of 
natural gas exports and wholesale trade within Europe [19]. Other 
works propose multilevel models for the gas market, including infra-
structure constraints under perfect competition and assuming interac-
tion between the operator and traders [20]. Similarly, the European Gas 
Market Model (EGMM) is a market equilibrium model for analysing the 
production, trade, storage, and natural gas consumption in Europe [21]. 
Meanwhile, the Global Gas Model is a model for studying European gas 
markets, which maximises the profit of market players and the behav-
iour of operators, and includes security of supply concerns [22,23]. 
Additionally, a minimum cost dispatch for the gas supply chain can be 
found in Ref. [24]. 
On the other hand, other studies propose models based on mathe-
matical programming techniques to evaluate investments in new infra-
structure within the EU. For example, the GASTALE model uses game 
theory, and the EUGAS and MAGELAN models use dynamic program-
ming to optimise investments in production and infrastructure capacity 
on a yearly basis [25,26]. Likewise, the COLUMBUS model optimises 
production, transport and storage capacities based on monthly resolu-
tion [27], the TIGER model minimises supply-demand transmission 
costs also with monthly granularity [28,29], and the GASMOPEC model 
enhances the decision-making process from a market perspective [30]. 
Despite analysing gas markets and infrastructures, these optimal 
models do not solve supply crises in the short term, but rather aim to 
assess the adequacy of the infrastructure in the long term. Therefore, it is 
essential to propose an optimal cooperative management model for the 
security of supply, which allows establishing the best strategies for 
dealing with crisis scenarios in case of disruptions in gas supply to the 
EU. 
Nomenclature 
Ci,d daily gas demand satisfied in country i (GWh/d) 
Pi,d daily gas production of country i (GWh/d) 
STi,d daily working gas available in storage every day in 
country i (GWh) 
SWRi,d daily gas storage withdrawal from underground storage 
in country i (GWh/d) 
IMPi,d daily gas pipeline imports from third-party countries to 
country i (GWh/d) 
LNGi,d daily gas injected from regasification plants into the 
pipes of country i (GWh/d) 
Xij,d daily gas flow through cross-border pipelines between 
countries i and j (GWh/d)  
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3. Proposed mathematical model 
Contingency plans to recover critical energy infrastructure after a 
severe failure are developed primarily at the national level. However, 
European energy infrastructures are interconnected between countries, 
and intentional attacks, natural hazards or limited third-party country 
supply can lead to restrictions on demand. In these cases, cooperative 
strategies may be implemented, instead of individual solutions, to 
jointly meet as much as possible the demand of all countries. 
The EU has proposed regulations to prepare and establish preventive 
and emergency action plans, seeking a cooperative approach among 
member states to reduce the impact of severe disruption scenarios. 
Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 on measures to safeguard the security of gas 
supply is currently being implemented to develop joint measures and 
facilitate the bi-directional capacity of cross-border interconnections 
under a cooperation framework between EU countries [11]. 
Given the dynamic nature of gas production flows, storage and net-
works, establishing contingency plans for all possible scenarios during a 
power supply crisis is practically impossible. In addition, infrastructure 
interventions may require updating, especially if the crisis lasts for a 
long period. This study proposes a formulation for managing inter-
connected natural gas infrastructures towards improving resilience 
when facing a supply crisis, that is, maintaining the maximum amount of 
gas supply to consumers during a two-week study period. Gas storage 
facilities and exchange between countries play a key role in this problem 
because they can extend gas supply for more days if used optimally. 
Using mathematical optimisation techniques instead of probabilistic 
approaches is appropriate when decisions concerning available re-
sources need to be quick since traditional probabilistic simulation 
models used for determining the disturbance impact on gas supply are 
more time-consuming. 
The proposed model maximises the daily coverage of the natural gas 
demand for fourteen days in a group of interconnected countries by 
providing collaborative solutions to supply crises due to technical, po-
litical or natural phenomena. Later, in Section 4, this model is applied to 
a series of case studies in the European gas transmission network. The 
mathematical equations of the model are derived by applying the 
principle of mass balance at each node of the network. Each country is 
represented by a node in a graph, following the Monte Carlo-based Gas 
Energy Network for Europe, Russia, and the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (MC-GENERCIS) and Gas Emergency Flow (GEMFLOW) 
models proposed by the Joint Research Centre of the European Com-
mission [14,31]. Such models can be applied to draw significant con-
clusions about gas system capacities even when a hydraulic model of the 
system is not used. They are used to assess the security of natural gas 
supply in the event of disruptions in the external supply of natural gas to 
the EU through cooperative mechanisms between member countries. 
Hydraulic models cannot be used due to the lack of detailed information 
on the infrastructures of these countries. 
In the model presented here, each country i is represented as a node 
in the natural gas transmission system. The resources involved every day 
d are the demand, Ci,d, the production, Pi,d, the daily storage facility’s 
withdrawal rate, Si,d, natural gas pipeline imports, IMPi,d, LNG shipping, 
LNGi,d, and the interconnection capacities between neighbouring 
countries Xij,d. 
The mathematical model uses the available capacities of each 
country once the internal demand has been met to identify the best 
solution for the fourteen days of the case study, that is, to get as close as 
possible to meeting the demand of the countries belonging to the 
interconnected natural gas system. Cross-border interconnections have a 
physical capacity that limits the flow and they can be uni-o bi-direc-
tional. Previous optimisation models for this problem have only solved 
gas supply for one day, and without sharing gas stored in the countries 
[32]. 
The mathematical optimisation problem is defined by the objective 
function of eq. (1) and by the set of constraints that are shown in eqs. 
(2)–(10). Cmaxi,d is the natural gas demand that the system seeks to meet 
every day, d, in each country, i, and Ci,d is the demand that is actually 
met. 
The maximum technical capacity for endogenous natural gas pro-
duction in each country (Pmaxi,d ) is a value which generally remains 
relatively stable over time and which is not affected in the two-week 
case study. The withdrawal rate of gas storage in each country results 
from solving the mathematical problem, and a different value is calcu-
lated for each day of the fourteen-day study period. 
The amount of third-party country pipeline natural gas imports is 
defined as the daily maximum available technical capacity from gas 
pipelines, in the direction of entry, to the countries in the network. 
The countries of the system with access to the sea may have receiving 
terminals and regasification plants for liquefied natural gas (LNG) sup-
ply. The possibility of using the nominal capacity of a regasification 
plant (LNGmaxi,d ) to supply the gas entry to natural gas transmission net-
works for fourteen days depends on the ability to maintain the supply 
flow to the terminal through LNG tankers because the storage capacity 






Ci,d (1)  
when 
0≤Ci,d ≤ Cmaxi,d (2)  
0≤Pi,d ≤ Pmaxi,d (3)  
0≤ IMPi,d ≤ IMPmaxi,d (4)  
0≤LNGi,d ≤ LNGmaxi,d (5) 
The amount of natural gas exchanged between countries helps to 
solve the possible shortage of domestic gas supply in some countries. 
The may vary with the direction of gas flow, as indicated in eq. (6). 
Balancing all possible gas resources in each country is expressed in eq. 
(7). 
− Xmaxji,d ≤ Xij,d ≤ X
max
ij,d (6)  
Pi,d + SWRi,d + IMPi,d + LNGi,d − Ci,d −
∑
Xij,d = 0 (7) 
Gas storage is a strategic resource for each country. However, under 
a cooperative scheme, gas storage can be decisive in supporting other 
countries in the system during a crisis. The underground gas storage 
capacity differs considerably between countries because it depends on 
the geological conditions and on the investments in infrastructure. There 
are three main types of underground storage: aquifer, salt cavern and 
depleted gas reservoir. The amount of gas available each day from an 
underground gas storage is characterised by the maximum withdrawal 
rate, SWRmaxi,d , and varies with the amount of working gas, STi,d, available 
in storage every day. In this model, the relationship between SWRmaxi,d and 
STi,d was estimated by linear regression, as mathematically expressed in 
eq. (9). The daily storage balance is indicated in eq. (10). 
0≤ SWRi,d ≤ SWRmaxi,d (8)  
SWRmaxi,d = aiSTi,d + bi (9)  
− SWRi,d− 1 + STi,d− 1 − STi,d = 0 (10) 
The mathematical optimisation problem defined in eqs. (1)–(10) is 
linear because the objective function is linear, the constraints are linear, 
and all variables are continuous. The optimisation problem is pro-
grammed and solved using the Optimisation Toolbox™ of Matla-
bR2019a by applying the linear programming function linprog and the 
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interior-point algorithm. The simulation framework runs on a computer 
with a 3.40 GHz CPU Intel® Core™ i7 processor and with 16 GB of RAM. 
The data on the technical capacities of different variables are sub-
jected to a pre-treatment before solving the optimisation problem. In 
reality, each country tries to meet its demand by first using its own re-
sources and then, under the cooperative scheme of the proposed model, 
making its surplus capacities available to the other countries in the 
system. Usually, the countries use their own resources in the following 
order: production, imported LNG and imported pipeline gas. Gas in 
underground storage is always the last resort since it is a more strategic 
resource. 
Table 1 
Mean data from the European natural gas system from the 14th to the 27th of January of 2017, and peak gas consumption on the 18th of January of 2017 (GWh/d).   
Daily averages from the 14th to the January 27, 2017 UGS Cross-border capacity Gas demand on the January 18, 2017 
Cmax  Pmax  IMPmax  LNGmax  STd=1  SWRd=1  Xmaxij  Xmaxji  Cmax  
Austria 517 44 0 0 23,657 998 2382 2290 550 
Belgium 929 0 488 225 2046 170 2380 2658 988 
Bosnia 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 11 
Bulgaria 142 3 766 0 1463 36 158 362 151 
Croatia 150 37 0 0 1383 58 0 129 159 
Czechia 511 5 0 0 9358 682 1923 1690 543 
Denmark 135 170 0 0 3075 194 33 61 144 
Estonia 21 0 48 0 0 0 0 63 22 
Finland 101 0 249 0 0 0 0 0 107 
France 2964 0 570 615 33,638 2205 695 1667 3152 
Germany 4347 189 3280 0 65,072 6657 5111 5384 4623 
Greece 215 0 49 75 0 0 0 109 229 
Hungary 598 68 605 0 16,781 812 270 283 636 
Ireland 181 120 0 0 0 0 0 432 192 
Italy 3840 171 1695 272 46,894 2703 41 1807 4084 
Latvia 62 0 179 0 6380 287 128 68 66 
Lithuania 89 0 325 61 0 0 68 65 95 
Macedonia 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 16 
Netherlands 1960 1936 0 218 37,700 2400 4288 2009 2084 
Poland 745 74 1336 79 8300 528 932 194 792 
Portugal 222 0 0 178 893 78 80 144 236 
Romania 624 314 370 0 8165 315 364 73 664 
Serbia 83 15 0 0 1133 52 15 142 88 
Slovakia 268 0 2080 0 9002 436 2285 1111 285 
Slovenia 45 0 0 0 0 0 75 141 48 
Spain 1412 3 732 956 7905 129 369 245 1502 
Switzerland 206 0 0 0 0 0 635 828 219 
UK 3612 2007 1499 823 12,703 1324 1062 1297 3841  
Table 2 
Capacity of the cross-border interconnections of the European natural gas system in January of 2017.   
Capacity max Capacity min  Capacity max Capacity min 
Unidirectional Belgium France 870 0 Bidirectional Spain France 225 − 165 
Germany France 571.8 0 Spain Portugal 144 − 80 
France Switzerland 260.4 0 Belgium Germany 313.1 − 320.1 
Belgium Netherlands 122 0 Netherlands Germany 889.7 − 1615.9 
Germany Switzerland 554.4 0 UK Belgium 630.1 − 803.4 
Switzerland Italy 634.7 0 Germany Austria 581.3 − 638.7 
Netherlands Germany 1466.8 0 Czechia Slovakia 696.8 − 400.4 
Netherlands UK 494 0 Latvia Lithuania 65.1 − 67.6 
Netherlands Belgium 1041.5 0 Austria Slovakia 320.2 − 1684.7 
UK Ireland 431.7 0 Belgium Netherlands 271.2 − 396 
Germany Austria 24.2 0 Italy Slovenia 28.5 − 21.5 
Slovenia Croatia 53.3 0 Germany Denmark 60.6 − 32.7 
Austria Italy 1150.5 0 Germany Poland 166.3 − 931.6 
Austria Slovenia 112.5 0 Hungary Romania 51.5 − 2.5 
Austria Hungary 153.1 0 Slovakia Czechia 73.1 − 93.9 
Latvia Estonia 63 0 Bulgaria Romania 21.6 − 1.6 
Czechia Germany 906.9 0 Germany Czechia 135.5 − 197.5 
Hungary Croatia 76 0     
Hungary Serbia 142.1 0     
Romania Bulgaria 751.2 0     
Bulgaria Greece 109.3 0     
Bulgaria Macedonia 27.4 0     
Serbia Bosnia 15 0     
Germany Czechia 1081.2 0     
Czechia Poland 28 0     
Slovakia Hungary 127 0     
France Belgium 270 0     
Italy Switzerland 12.9 0     
Austria Germany 6.9 0      
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4. Case studies 
The sharp demand in gas that occurred during the European cold 
wave of January 2017 lasting several weeks was used as an application 
example to show the utility of the proposed model. The demand for gas 
shows a strong seasonal pattern in Europe, with a higher demand in 
winter. These variations are largely due to the temperature-related 
demand for heating in the residential and tertiary sectors. 
As mentioned in Section 1, the two-week case study is a common 
design among simulation studies on the security of natural gas supply in 
Europe. Other studies analyse system capacities in the very short term, 
on the day of peak gas demand [32], and in the very long term, assuming 
supply crisis from one to three months [33]. However, the most inter-
esting case is that of two weeks because this period makes it possible to 
assess the effect of a cold wave [13]. 
Almost 90% of the natural gas consumption in the EU derives from 
third countries [8]. If, in addition to a high demand for natural gas in 
several countries, additional constraints are imposed on natural gas 
imports, the system may enter into severe stress. This extreme situation 
may be exacerbated if the underground gas storage is low, which usually 
occurs in late winter. Therefore, to demonstrate the applicability of the 
mathematical model for optimal management presented in Section 3, 
the consumption data recorded from the 14th to the 27th of January of 
2017 was used here together with the scenarios of total or partial 
disruption of gas imports to the EU. 
The average demand during the fourteen-day peak demand period 
from the 14th to January 27, 2017, was 24,000 GWh/d. The peak gas 
demand in the EU was reached on the January 18, 2017, which was 
25,521 GWh/d [34]. Interestingly, the peak electricity demand in the 
EU, that is, 581,276 MW, was also reached on the same day [35]. The 
interaction between the gas system and the electric power system must 
be considered because combined-cycle gas-fired power stations play a 
key role in maintaining the electricity supply as a backup for renewables 
during dark doldrums, a cold period such as a two-week cold wave with 
very low renewable electricity generation. 
Another reason for selecting the cold wave of the 2017 Winter is that 
the storage inventory level in January and February 2017 was at historic 
lows, reducing the contribution from underground gas storage (UGS) to 
safeguarding the supply in the event of additional unforeseen 
Fig. 1. Natural gas transmission system of the European Union in 2017.  
Fig. 2. Withdrawal capacity versus UGS inventory level of some EU coun-
tries [41]. 
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contingencies [34]. 
Data from the European natural gas system in January 2017 are 
outlined in Tables 1 and 2. The gas demand values were retrieved from 
Ref. [36], while the values of natural gas production, imports, LNG and 
cross-border capacity were gathered from Ref. [37]. The UGS data were 
collected from Ref. [38]. In the case study, EU countries and the 
following neighbouring countries were considered: Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
North Macedonia, Switzerland and Serbia. 
The natural gas system represented in Fig. 1 includes 28 countries, 
which, in 2017, were connected by 35 cross-border interconnections, 18 
of which were bi-directional. These infrastructures have been expanded 
in recent years to improve the European security of natural gas supply. 
A few EU countries, such as Italy, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands, have the highest underground gas storage capacity. For 
geological reasons, Eastern and South-Eastern European countries have 
only a small gas storage capacity [39]. Therefore, properly using inter-
connection capacities between countries by optimally managing 
cross-border gas pipelines for trading gas from underground storage can 
improve the ability of EU and other neighbouring countries to meet the 
gas demand. 
In this study, a model of underground gas storage is applied, 
assessing the UGS inventory effect on the withdrawal rate using deliv-
erability curves. The amount of gas that can be withdrawn from a 
storage facility decreases with the decrease in stored gas [40]. Fig. 2 
shows the curves of three EU countries built using the data provided by 
the Gas Storage Europe [41]. These curves represent a weighted average 
of the facilities in each country (salt caverns, aquifers or depleted gas 
reservoirs). 
Fig. 2 shows an inflexion point in the curves when storage is higher 
than 50% inventory level, and the relation between the withdrawal rate 
and the stored gas is approximately linear when this level continues to 
decrease. For this reason, in the mathematical model of Section 3, a 
linear equation was proposed to relate the withdrawal rate to the UGS 
inventory between 0% and 50% of the UGS stock, as shown in eq. (9). 
The parameters of the equations for each country, calculated in Table 3, 
were determined by linear approximation in two sections of the data 
provided in Ref. [41] for UGS lower than 50% inventory level. The 
representation of eq. (9) in Fig. 3, for the same countries of Fig. 2, shows 
the goodness-of-fit of the linear approximation. 
The mathematical optimisation tool developed in this research 
identified the best daily solution for gas resources (especially the use of 
UGS and cross-border capacities between countries) to meet as much as 
possible the natural gas demand for two weeks, not by maximising the 
demand met each day but by maximising the demand over the entire 
fourteen-day period. That is, a global solution to the problem was 
offered, instead of providing daily solutions that may not be optimal in 
the medium term. In addition, the solution ensures the best cooperation 
between the EU countries with the common goal of supplying natural 
gas to their end consumers, thereby meeting the demand. 
Case studies were defined to assess the impact of various scenarios of 
gas supply disruption coupled with a low initial storage level during very 
high demand events:  
• Case 1. Demand from the 14th to the 27th of January of 2017 and 
50% initial storage  
• Case 2. Russian pipeline gas supply disruption and 50% initial 
storage  
• Case 3. LNG supply disruption and 50% initial storage  
• Case 4. Demand from the 14th to the 27th of January of 2017 and 
20% initial storage.  
• Case 5. Russian pipeline gas supply disruption and 20% initial 
storage.  
• Case 6. LNG supply disruption and 20% initial storage. 
Case 1 analyses the capacity of the gas system to cope with a situa-
tion of high demand and half empty gas storage, that is, 50% inventory 
level. This was the real scenario in January of 2017 because an unusu-
ally cold winter quickly emptied UGS facilities, which only had 50% 
working gas stored at the beginning of the second half of January [34]. 
Cases 2 and 3, in addition to the situation of high gas demand, 
Table 3 
Parameters ai and bi of eq. (9), modelling UGS inventory lower than 50% for 
each country.  
Country i ai bi 
Austria 0.01953 535.52 
Belgium 0.06297 40.68 
Bosnia 0.00000 0.00 
Bulgaria 0.01584 13.03 
Croatia 0.03593 8.48 
Czechia 0.04585 253.18 
Denmark 0.04425 58.32 
Estonia 0.00000 0.00 
Finland 0.00000 0.00 
France 0.03427 1052.52 
Germany 0.06491 2433.92 
Greece 0.00000 0.00 
Hungary 0.02246 435.46 
Ireland 0.00000 0.00 
Italy 0.03483 1069.20 
Latvia 0.02716 113.40 
Lithuania 0.00000 0.00 
Macedonia 0.00000 0.00 
Netherlands 0.03850 948.89 
Poland 0.03666 223.91 
Portugal 0.05280 30.84 
Romania 0.02335 124.76 
Serbia 0.02768 20.52 
Slovakia 0.02929 172.57 
Slovenia 0.00000 0.00 
Spain 0.00651 77.22 
Switzerland 0.00000 0.00 
UK 0.06301 523.89  
Fig. 3. Withdrawal capacity versus UGS inventory level of some EU countries 
upon linear approximation. 
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included a hypothetical disruption of either gas imports from Russia to 
Central Europe by pipeline (Case 2) or LNG supply by sea (Case 3) during 
the fourteen-day study period. These situations are unlikely, but not 
impossible as similar events have already been recorded on different 
occasions in the past, particularly disruption of gas supply from Russia 
[42]. Any problem related to gas supply from Russia greatly impacts the 
downstream EU countries because Russia is the main supplier, with a 
40% import quota for pipeline gas and 17% for LNG [43]. Russian 
natural gas is exported to the European market through five main 
pipelines, of which the two most important transit the Ukraine. Tense 
relations between Russia and Ukraine result in a high-risk scenario [44]. 
On the other hand, a global LNG supply crisis is possible, as recent 
events in January 2021 demonstrated when LNG shipments were 
diverted from Europe to Asia for commercial reasons in an unprece-
dented event during a severe cold snap. Europe had to increase the gas 
extraction from its storage reserves and use the import capacity of 
pipeline gas to overcome the lack of LNG supply. As a result, current gas 
storage levels in Europe decreased to a minimum after winter and in-
ventory levels required for next winter were at risk. 
To illustrate the behaviour of the mathematical model proposed for 
the European natural gas infrastructure, the previous cases were 
repeated in the scenario with the lowest level of gas storage (20%), that 
is, Cases 4, 5 and 6. These scenarios are not that unlikely because, for 
example, UGS stock levels reached 18.4% by the end of the 2018 winter 
[45]. 
5. Simulation results 
This section presents the results of the six case studies defined above 
to illustrate how the tool proposed in this research can facilitate stra-
tegies for the best use of resources and infrastructures in the event of a 
two-week gas supply crisis. In each case, the formulation of the linear 
optimisation problem defined by eqs. (1)–(10) was applied to data from 
the European gas system outlined in Table 1 and to the 2017 capacities 
of the unidirectional and bidirectional gas pipelines of the in-
terconnections of Fig. 1 and Table 2.  
• Case 1 (demand from the 14th to the 27th of January of 2017 and 
50% initial storage) 
Table 4 outlines the results of the base case, defined with the gas 
demand data recorded from the 14th to the 27th of January of 2017. 
During this period, the storage inventory level in European countries 
was approximately 50%, that is, 294,000 GWh. The results indicate that 
the best solution to cooperatively meet the demand for gas during those 
two weeks, under the assumptions explained in Section 3, would consist 
of using 100% of the available gas production resources of countries 
from the system (mainly the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), 96% 
of the resources contributed by LNG terminals and 69% of the capacity 
of pipeline gas imports. Underground gas reservoirs would be emptied to 
37% storage level. 
The use rate of cross-border interconnections would average 37% of 
the available capacity in unidirectional and bidirectional gas pipelines 
(see Table 9); that is, to meet the average daily demand of 24,000 GWh/ 
d during the two-week study period, 8700 GWh/d would have to be 
exchanged between the countries of the system, highlighting the 
importance of gas transit for ensuring the availability of each country to 
the other members of the system. 
Underground gas storage also plays a key role in the optimal strategy 
to meet the demand. The results from using UGS outlined in Table 5 
showed that withdrawal would increase in the first five days but would 
decrease in the following days. These findings are consistent because the 
Table 4 
Breakdown of the main results by country in Case 1.   
Demand satisfied Production used LNG imports used Pipeline imports used UGS ST 100% UGS ST 50% UGS SWR 50% UGS ST final 
GWh % GWh % GWh % GWh % GWh GWh GWh/d GWh % 
Austria 7274 100% 616 100% 0  0  47,315 23,657 998 19,760 42% 
Belgium 13,066 100% 0  3143 100% 6832 100% 4092 2046 170 1610 39% 
Bosnia 145 100% 0  0  0  0 0 0 0  
Bulgaria 1997 100% 42 100% 0  2499 23% 2926 1463 36 1312 45% 
Croatia 2103 100% 518 100% 0  0  2765 1383 58 1056 38% 
Czechia 7181 100% 70 100% 0  0  18,715 9358 682 7979 43% 
Denmark 1904 100% 2031 85% 0  0  6150 3075 194 2920 47% 
Estonia 291 100% 0  0  291 43% 0 0 0 0  
Finland 1415 100% 0  0  1415 41% 0 0 0 0  
France 41,684 100% 0  8610 100% 7980 100% 67,275 33,638 2205 24,408 36% 
Germany 61,138 100% 2646 100% 0  45,926 100% 130,144 65,072 6657 30,986 24% 
Greece 3028 100% 0  1050 100% 680 100% 0 0 0 0  
Hungary 8411 100% 952 100% 0  7730 91% 33,563 16,781 812 15,957 48% 
Ireland 2539 100% 1680 100% 0  0  0 0 0 0  
Italy 54,010 100% 2394 100% 3801 100% 23,730 100% 93,787 46,894 2703 35,303 38% 
Latvia 873 100% 0  0  873 35% 12,760 6380 287 6380 50% 
Lithuania 1256 100% 0  854 100% 402 9% 0 0 0 0  
Macedonia 212 100% 0  0  0  0 0 0 0  
Netherlands 27,560 100% 27,104 100% 1217 40% 0  75,399 37,700 2400 30,630 41% 
Poland 10,474 100% 1036 100% 1106 100% 9701 52% 16,601 8300 528 7113 43% 
Portugal 3121 100% 0  2492 100% 0  1785 893 78 623 35% 
Romania 8781 100% 4396 100% 0  4385 85% 16,329 8165 315 7714 47% 
Serbia 1160 100% 211 100% 0  0  2265 1133 52 962 42% 
Slovakia 3769 100% 0  0  6398 22% 18,003 9002 436 7799 43% 
Slovenia 635 100% 0  0  0  0 0 0 0  
Spain 19,864 100% 42 100% 13,377 100% 7281 71% 15,810 7905 129 7388 47% 
Switzerland 2896 100% 0  0  0  0 0 0 0  
UK 50,796 100% 28,098 100% 11,515 100% 12,483 59% 25,406 12,703 1324 11,031 43%  
TOTAL 337,583 100% 71,836 100% 47,165 96% 138,606 69% 591,090 295,548 20,064 220,931 37%  




Optimal UGS management in Case 1.  
• Case 2 (demand from the 14th to the 27th of January of 2017, 50% initial storage and Russian pipeline gas supply disruption)   
Withdrawal rate - SWR (GWh/d) 
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 8 Day 9 Day 10 Day 11 Day 12 Day 13 Day 14 
Austria 143 238 252 269 328 294 303 317 329 341 352 362 369 240 
Belgium 25 25 26 28 31 31 33 35 36 38 40 43 45 57 
Bosnia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 13 11 11 11 12 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 12 13 
Croatia 26 25 25 25 29 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 26 
Czechia 13 57 71 89 110 105 108 114 122 132 143 154 163 201 
Denmark 12 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 13 12 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 467 591 629 632 820 662 692 708 748 790 817 833 839 898 
Germany 3493 3200 3064 2944 3110 2696 2579 2469 2349 2232 2109 1975 1865 1537 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 53 64 64 64 74 64 64 64 64 63 63 63 62 55 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 732 766 798 814 1053 874 901 926 936 941 946 953 951 985 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Macedonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 344 448 468 490 590 529 545 561 574 585 615 646 673 732 
Poland 18 44 65 74 91 87 92 99 106 115 123 132 140 155 
Portugal 19 17 17 18 22 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 27 
Romania 32 34 34 34 40 34 34 34 35 35 35 35 35 33 
Serbia 13 12 12 12 14 13 13 13 13 14 14 14 15 17 
Slovakia 21 56 61 73 97 90 95 101 108 116 123 129 133 145 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 30 31 32 35 44 39 41 42 43 44 45 45 46 47 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UK 46 84 88 104 165 141 147 151 154 154 150 147 141 183  
TOTAL 5500 5714 5728 5727 6642 5727 5716 5703 5688 5671 5647 5603 5551 5363   
UGS level - ST (GWh) 
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 8 Day 9 Day 10 Day 11 Day 12 Day 13 Day 14 
Austria 23,657 23,514 23,277 23,024 22,755 22,427 22,133 21,829 21,513 21,184 20,843 20,491 20,129 19,760 
Belgium 2046 2021 1996 1970 1943 1911 1880 1847 1813 1777 1738 1698 1655 1610 
Bosnia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 1463 1450 1439 1428 1416 1405 1393 1382 1371 1359 1347 1336 1324 1312 
Croatia 1383 1357 1332 1308 1283 1254 1229 1204 1179 1155 1130 1105 1081 1056 
Czechia 9358 9344 9288 9217 9128 9019 8914 8806 8692 8570 8439 8296 8142 7979 
Denmark 3075 3063 3052 3041 3029 3017 3005 2993 2981 2969 2957 2945 2932 2920 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 33,638 33,170 32,579 31,950 31,318 30,498 29,836 29,144 28,435 27,687 26,897 26,080 25,247 24,408 
Germany 65,072 61,579 58,379 55,315 52,371 49,262 46,566 43,987 41,518 39,168 36,936 34,827 32,851 30,986 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 16,781 16,729 16,665 16,601 16,537 16,463 16,399 16,336 16,272 16,208 16,145 16,082 16,019 15,957 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 46,894 46,162 45,396 44,598 43,783 42,730 41,856 40,955 40,029 39,093 38,152 37,207 36,254 35,303 
Latvia 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 6380 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Macedonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 37,700 37,355 36,907 36,439 35,949 35,359 34,830 34,285 33,724 33,150 32,565 31,950 31,304 30,630 
(continued on next page) 
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gas demand of the European system peaked on the 18th of January. In 
the breakdown of the data by country outlined in Table 4, the extensive 
use of UGS in Germany stands out. As a result, its storage stock would 
reach 24% at the end of the study period, a very low value that could 
compromise supply in the remaining weeks of winter. Germany is a 
country with a large storage capacity and a strategic position in Central 
Europe, with many gas pipelines interconnecting with neighbouring 
countries. For these reasons, Germany represents 45% of total deliver-
ability from natural gas storage in the EU during the two-week period. 
Table 6 outlines the results of Case 2, considering a total disruption 
of the pipeline gas supply to Central Europe from Russia. The main 
conclusion of this hypothetical case study is that, even with the best 
possible strategy for gas supply, it would not be possible to meet the 
demand in five countries, and South-Eastern European countries would 
be the most affected (see Fig. 4). This supply crisis would occur despite 
increasing the use of all available resources: 100% own production, 97% 
LNG regasification capacity and 86% available capacity to import 
pipeline gas (mainly from Norway and Algeria because importing gas 
from Russia would not be available in this case). Underground gas 
storage use would also increase, leaving the available UGS working gas 
reserves at 29% by the end of the fourteen-day study period. 
These results are in line with the forecasting studies conducted by 
operators of the European networks at the beginning of the 2016/2017 
winter [46]. Those studies predicted a possible gas supply drop in 
South-Eastern European countries if the Russian gas transit through 
Ukraine was disrupted. In our case study, the situation is even more 
critical because supply through Belarus is also disrupted. 
• Case 3 (demand from the 14th to the 27th of January of 2017, 50% 
initial storage and LNG supply disruption). 
This case illustrates a scenario of prolonged disruption of LNG 
shipping, which could occur for commercial or meteorological reasons. 
The results outlined in Table 7 show that Spain, Portugal and Greece 
would not meet their demand for natural gas. In other words, the LNG 
shortage would affect only the three countries located in the corners of 
the continent as they are more dependent on LNG and have weak gas 
pipeline interconnections with their European neighbours. The analysis 
of the results from Spain in more detail shows that, surprisingly, only 
20% storage is used because gas withdrawal is limited by a low daily 
deliverability due to the type of underground storage existing in the 
country [41]. 
• Cases 4, 5 and 6 (20% instead of 50% initial storage). 
As indicated in the description of the case studies, the calculations 
made in three new scenarios are repeated assuming that the UGS in-
ventory status is 20% instead of 50% at the beginning of the fourteen- 
day study period. 
The mathematical tool provides the best possible solution to meet the 
demand, optimising the management of all capacities of the European 
natural gas system. As expected, the results clearly showed an increased 
use of available resources (see Table 8) and cross-border capacities be-
tween the countries of the system (see Table 9). In particular, UGS would 
be intensively used, leaving the inventory levels of working gas of the 
storage facilities at minimum values, lower than 8%. Nevertheless, only 
10 of the 28 countries would be able to meet the national demand for 
natural gas, while five countries would not be able to meet 80% of the 
demand. Bulgaria and Bosnia would be the most affected countries, 
meeting only 50% of consumer needs during the two-week study period 
(see Fig. 5). In order to graphically present some of the findings, Fig. 6 
shows the main comparative results of the case studies. 
The analysis of Cases 2 and 5 shows some relevant differences in the 
use of cross-border interconnections from the other cases. The disrup-
tion of the Russian pipeline gas supply forces the internal gas pipelines in 
the EU system to reconfigure, reducing the use of unidirectional pipe-
lines and increasing the use of bidirectional pipelines (see Table 9). This 
shift occurs because some unidirectional pipelines of the EU system are 
designed for gas transit from Russia to other European countries. 
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compensating for the loss of the Russian supply and by rebalancing in-
ternal gas flows in the EU system with the increase in the use of UGS and 
other sources of natural gas supply. 
6. Conclusions 
This article proposed a mathematical tool to maximise the coverage 
of global demand for natural gas during a fourteen-day supply crisis in 
the European natural gas system. The tool offers collaborative solutions 
to crises spurred by political events or natural phenomena, facilitating 
strategies for the optimal use of available resources and facilities, such as 
liquefied natural gas, underground storage and cross-border in-
terconnections. The tool makes it possible to quickly update the 
decision-making process in the event of a supply crisis because its 
computation only requires seconds, while other techniques take hours or 
days to reach solutions as those based on simulation methods. 
Six case studies were applied evaluate the impact of various gas 
supply disruption scenarios considering two different levels of initial 
storage during high-demand events. The findings demonstrated the 
applicability of the proposal, identifying optimal solutions throughout 
the entire interconnected gas infrastructure. 
The mathematical model developed here can be applied to any 
interconnected gas system but is particularly relevant for the EU. Gas 
shortages can have significant economic and social effects in the EU, as it 
is highly dependent on external supplies. Therefore, the proposed tool 
offers means to meet the challenging objectives of Regulation (EU) 
2017/1938, i.e. to provide a more cooperative approach, reduce the 
impact of gas supply disruptions and address the potential vulnerabil-
ities in some member states revealed in this research for a two-week 
supply crisis. As observed in the case studies, South Eastern European 
countries are highly vulnerable to gas disruptions from Russia, while the 
Iberian Peninsula and Greece are more exposed to LNG shortages. These 
findings are quite similar to those already obtained in other studies 
developed by the European Network of Transmission System Operators 
for Gas (ENTSO-G) [47]. 
Table 6 
Breakdown of the main results by country in Case 2.   
Demand satisfied Production used LNG imports used Pipeline imports used UGS ST 100% UGS ST 50% UGS SWR 50% UGS ST final 
GWh % GWh % GWh % GWh % GWh GWh GWh/d GWh % 
Austria 7274 100% 616 100% 0  0  47,315 23,657 998 17,434 37% 
Belgium 13,066 100% 0  3143 100% 6832 100% 4092 2046 170 1475 36% 
Bosnia 145 100% 0  0  0  0 0 0 0  
Bulgaria 1304 65% 42 100% 0  0  2926 1463 36 1035 35% 
Croatia 2103 100% 518 100% 0  0  2765 1383 58 1011 37% 
Czechia 7181 100% 70 100% 0  0  18,715 9358 682 6174 33% 
Denmark 1904 100% 2028 85% 0  0  6150 3075 194 2914 47% 
Estonia 291 100% 0  0  0  0 0 0 0  
Finland 1415 100% 0  0  1415 41% 0 0 0 0  
France 41,684 100% 0  8610 100% 7980 100% 67,275 33,638 2205 20,964 31% 
Germany 61,138 100% 2646 100% 0  23,943 100% 130,144 65,072 6657 20,661 16% 
Greece 2510 83% 0  1050 100% 680 100% 0 0 0 0  
Hungary 8411 100% 952 100% 0  0  33,563 16,781 812 10,078 30% 
Ireland 2539 100% 1680 100% 0  0  0 0 0 0  
Italy 54,010 100% 2394 100% 3801 100% 23,730 100% 93,787 46,894 2703 30,566 33% 
Latvia 873 100% 0  0  0  12,760 6380 287 4925 39% 
Lithuania 1256 100% 0  854 100% 0  0 0 0 0  
Macedonia 130 61% 0  0  0  0 0 0 0  
Netherlands 27,560 100% 27,104 100% 1387 45% 0  75,399 37,700 2400 24,247 32% 
Poland 10,324 99% 1036 100% 1106 100% 0  16,601 8300 528 3179 19% 
Portugal 3121 100% 0  2492 100% 0  1785 893 78 606 34% 
Romania 7207 82% 4396 100% 0  0  16,329 8165 315 4593 28% 
Serbia 1160 100% 211 100% 0  0  2265 1133 52 877 39% 
Slovakia 3769 100% 0  0  0  18,003 9002 436 6748 37% 
Slovenia 635 100% 0  0  0  0 0 0 0  
Spain 19,864 100% 42 100% 13,377 100% 7368 72% 15,810 7905 129 7293 46% 
Switzerland 2896 100% 0  0  0  0 0 0 0  
UK 50,796 100% 28,098 100% 11,515 100% 12,550 60% 25,406 12,703 1324 8958 35%  
TOTAL 334,566 99% 71,833 100% 47,335 97% 84,498 86% 591,090 295,548 20,064 173,738 29%  
Fig. 4. Demand met by country in Case 2 study.  
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Given the dynamic nature of demand, production, storage and 
network flows, it is challenging to establish contingency plans in 
advance for all possible scenarios during a supply crisis. In fact, it may be 
necessary to continuously update the actions to be taken on the infra-
structure, even if the crisis continues for an extended period. The 
cooperative solution resulting from the proposed mathematical model 
would enable rapid recovery of transnational gas infrastructures after a 
Table 7 
Breakdown of the main results by country in Case 3.   
Demand satisfied Production used LNG imports used Pipeline imports used UGS ST 100% UGS ST 50% UGS SWR 50% UGS ST final 
GWh % GWh % GWh % GWh % GWh GWh GWh/d GWh % 
Austria 7274 100% 616 100% 0 0% 0  47,315 23,657 998 19,212 41% 
Belgium 13,066 100% 0  0 0% 6832 100% 4092 2046 170 1538 38% 
Bosnia 145 100% 0  0 0% 0  0 0 0 0  
Bulgaria 1997 100% 42 100% 0 0% 2580 24% 2926 1463 36 1293 44% 
Croatia 2103 100% 518 100% 0 0% 0  2765 1383 58 1035 37% 
Czechia 7181 100% 70 100% 0 0% 0  18,715 9358 682 7059 38% 
Denmark 1904 100% 2029 85% 0 0% 0  6150 3075 194 2921 47% 
Estonia 291 100% 0  0 0% 291 43% 0 0 0 0  
Finland 1415 100% 0  0 0% 1415 41% 0 0 0 0  
France 41,684 100% 0  0 0% 7980 100% 67,275 33,638 2205 15,976 24% 
Germany 61,138 100% 2646 100% 0 0% 45,926 100% 130,144 65,072 6657 30,127 23% 
Greece 2210 73% 0  0 0% 680 100% 0 0 0 0  
Hungary 8411 100% 952 100% 0 0% 7702 91% 33,563 16,781 812 15,831 47% 
Ireland 2539 100% 1680 100% 0 0% 0  0 0 0 0  
Italy 54,010 100% 2394 100% 0 0% 23,730 100% 93,787 46,894 2703 32,592 35% 
Latvia 873 100% 0  0 0% 873 35% 12,760 6380 287 6380 50% 
Lithuania 1256 100% 0  0 0% 1256 28% 0 0 0 0  
Macedonia 212 100% 0  0 0% 0  0 0 0 0  
Netherlands 27,560 100% 27,104 100% 0 0% 0  75,399 37,700 2400 28,145 37% 
Poland 10,474 100% 1036 100% 0 0% 11,658 62% 16,601 8300 528 6561 40% 
Portugal 1274 41% 0  0 0% 0  1785 893 78 145 8% 
Romania 8781 100% 4396 100% 0 0% 4385 85% 16,329 8165 315 7642 47% 
Serbia 1160 100% 211 100% 0 0% 0  2265 1133 52 955 42% 
Slovakia 3769 100% 0  0 0% 8236 28% 18,003 9002 436 7375 41% 
Slovenia 635 100% 0  0 0% 0  0 0 0 0  
Spain 13,840 70% 42 100% 0 0% 10,248 100% 15,810 7905 129 6295 40% 
Switzerland 2896 100% 0  0 0% 0  0 0 0 0  
UK 50,796 100% 28,098 100% 0 0% 20,987 100% 25,406 12,703 1324 9233 36%  
TOTAL 328,894 97% 71,834 100% 0 0% 154,779 77% 591,090 295,548 20,064 200,315 34%  
Table 8 
Main results of the case studies.   
Demand satisfied Production used LNG imports used Pipeline imports used UGS final 
GWh % GWh % GWh % GWh % GWh % 
Case 1 Base case, UGS level at 50% 337,583 100% 71,836 100% 47,165 96% 138,606 69% 220,931 37% 
Case 2 Disruption from Russia, UGS level at 50% 334,566 99% 71,833 100% 47,335 97% 84,498 86% 173,738 29% 
Case 3 LNG disruption, UGS level at 20% 328,894 97% 71,834 100% 0 0% 154,779 77% 200,315 34% 
Case 4 Base case, UGS level at 20% 337,583 100% 71,830 100% 47,329 97% 143,463 72% 47,926 8% 
Case 5 Disruption from Russia, UGS level at 20% 327,797 97% 71,929 100% 49,000 100% 191,689 96% 9053 2% 
Case 6 LNG disruption, UGS level at 20% 326,759 97% 71,835 100% 0 0% 166,150 83% 35,268 6%  
Fig. 5. Demand met by country in Case Study 5.  Fig. 6. Comparative results of the case studies.  
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partial or total outage caused by intentional threats, technical failures or 
natural disasters. In this way, the proposal could be helpful for trans-
mission system operators, public authorities, utilities and other stake-
holders. Moreover, measures taken for the security and resilience of gas 
systems could also benefit electrical infrastructure and minimise 
cascading effects across the energy sector as natural gas and power 
systems become increasingly interconnected. 
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Table 9 
Average daily use of cross-border capacities.   
Unidirectional Bidirectional Average 
GWh/d % GWh/d % % 
Capacity max 11,558  4674   
Capacity min   − 7453   
Case 1 6193 54% 1661 36% 37% 
− 897 12% 
Case 2 5603 48% 2709 58% 36% 
− 233 3% 
Case 3 6418 56% 1342 29% 39% 
− 1517 20% 
Case 4 6283 54% 1588 34% 38% 
− 1060 14% 
Case 5 5251 45% 2975 64% 36% 
− 284 4% 
Case 6 6539 57% 928 20% 40% 
− 2067 28%  
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